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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue in this case on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment for respondent and against 
appellant. More particularly, the appellant submits the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment since (a) the evidence 
on which it was based was inadmissible hearsay evidence; (b) the 
evidence is insufficient to show personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 
STATUTES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES 
Rule 803(6), U.R.E., 1983: 
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of 
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made 
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted 
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was 
the regular practice of that business activity to make 
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, 
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or 
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness. The term 'business1 as used 
in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
Rule 1002, U.R.E., 1983: 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in 
these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court of this State or by statute. 
§78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953, included in addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, John Saurini, defendant below, appeals from a 
summary judgment in favor of respondent D & L Supply granting 
judgment against appellant in the sum of $182,435.97. 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT BELOW 
Respondent, plaintiff below, filed suit on August 29, 1985, 
in Fourth District Court, seeking damages from the defendant on 
account of goods and merchandise sold by the respondent. (R.l) 
Summons was served on appellant in Adams County, Colorado (R.5) 
An answer and counterclaim was filed on September 26, 1985 by 
appellant through Colorado counsel. (R.6) On March 10, 1986, 
the respondent moved for summary judgment. On April 21, 1986, 
the trial court granted summary judgment for the respondent in 
the sum of $182,435.97. (R.36) On May 15, 1986, defendant filed 
2 
a mot ion t o set a s i d e t h e summary judgment under Rule 60(1 
II I I1 I! Il I  s i i t :. 
on May 20
 r 19Bt>f the appellant tiled a notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I h e < DIII|JI I i i mt i 11 i ( " ,| l.i I  i i p p 1 y , i l l e q e i l I In?. 
respondent was a Utah corporate doing business in Lindon, Utah 
and that appellant Saurir; * -^  * resident of the State of 
Colorado, who il: la ....,.*
 :, - " 5 I Si :i| >pl i ai id ag t: eec 
pay for the goods ^ offices in Lindon, Utah S I 
«! 1 a i med - iamages plus interest and attorney fees. 
(R.l-2) 
Saur. iLed an answer and counterclaK (R.6) He denied 
al I courts, nor 
Utah Sai iri ni 
& I i i, i e x = 
naividually 
subjected himself to the jurisdiction t-
that he had transacted business - - State 
*i L S U I Dill III f ' l i n J h l M I I l i t : ' l i l t . " I I I  111 I I I II 11 I I I  I I 
Colorado corporation and that Saurj <.. :. • 
liable. '> >) 
: • 
The m o t i o n *-. : r ^ : - u i e i 1 , • -- i f f i d a v i t 
P r e s i d e n t -v ! orporatio? 
t::l iat Lef tu . 
years, Leftwich said Ln 198i> he concluded he would no 1 onger do 
: >acK wettvvich, 
iffidavit refi! ^ ed 
business with Saurini on a corporate basis and advised him that 
Saurini would be personally liable for further orders, (R.26) 
Leftwich said Saurini agreed he would be personally responsible• 
(R.27) Leftwich asserted Saurini had been to Leftwich's place of 
business on a number of occasions (R.27) but did not say when. 
Leftwich also swore that before every shipment it was agreed 
shipments would be made FOB Lindon, Utah, and that payment would 
be made at D & L Supply offices in Lindon. 
Leftwich's affidavit then states, "I have reviewed the 
business records of [D & L] and have determined that total 
charges made by [Saurini] personally in November of 1982 to and 
including credits given to him in 1984" were in the sum of 
$167,842.70 and that the records show $27,523.59 was paid by 
Saurini leaving $140,319.11 due. (R.27) Interest in the sum of 
18% on part and 10% on another part (R.28) provided the claim for 
the judgment of $182,435.97. No evidence of the records was 
actually introduced nor did Leftwich purport to testify from his 
personal knowledge. 
The trial judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. (R. 33) They were prepared by respondent's counsel and 
bear the heading of respondent's counsel. (R.33) The findings 
of fact recite the material contained in Leftwich's affidavit but 
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also contain matter outside the affidavi• otherwise supported 
(1 ) "Shipments were made pursuant to instructions at the 
time any such orders were received." 
(2) " I"11«'i I i " 11 r11ei s woi P i i'("«• • i vI • 11 \iy 111 i.i i nl ill i t 
its p l a c e »• b u s i n e s s L i n d o n , U t a h C o u n t y , S t a t e of Utah ," 
v ^ shipments were shipped FOB, Lindon, Utah 
pursuar nippin 
"Pursuant t iealings of the parries, plaintiff 
made numerous charges from its plant aiid received numerous 
payments for ™»r»w of c^ \ shipments pursuant to the agreement at 
its offices . Lindon, Utah County, State of Utah." 
' • * * " MI rh '" s df f i d.iv it i ir 
embellishments on the matter contained in the affidavit. 
Summary judgment was entered April Mf 1986, (R. w.| 
( I • 1 in i 1 i i i * I in 11 in in I i 
appeal, but was based oi i a cl a -i excusable neglect to answer 
the affidavit of respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affidavit rel led on in the trial court by respondent for 
summary judgment insufficient support summary judgment 
because it contc hearsay evic -;:. *- =; i I :: t: ] : as< 3d :)i i, I:::l ic= 
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personal knowledge of the declarant, and violates the best 
evidence rule. 
In addition, the affidavit for summary judgment did not 
present adequate evidence to show a basis for personal 
jurisdiction of the trial court over the appellant. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SINCE: (A) THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH IT WAS BASED WAS 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE; (B) THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. It is well settled that summary judgment must be based 
on admissible evidence. Hearsay evidence or evidence that is 
otherwise inadmissible cannot be the basis for summary judgment. 
Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Durham v. Maraetts, 
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 
*P.2d 1021 (1968); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 29 
Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 638 (1973). An affidavit not based on the 
personal knowledge of the affiant and setting forth admissible 
evidence and showing affiant can testify to matters in the 
affidavit will not support a summary judgment. Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 
(1972); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 253, 451 P.2d 769 
(1969); Triloaaan v. Trilocrcran. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
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In Walker v, Rockv Mountain Recreation Corp,, supra, this 
Court observed: 
"The opposing affidavit submitted by defendant did not 
comport with the requirements of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., 
i.e., such an affidavit must be made on personal 
knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts that 
would be admissible in evidence and show that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Statements made merely on information and 
belief will be disregarded. Hearsay and opinion 
testimony that would not be admissible if testified to 
at the trial may not properly be set forth in an 
affidavit." 
It is submitted in this case the affidavit of Jack Leftwich 
(R.26) is wholly deficient to support the summary judgment for 
D fit L Supply because it did not contain admissible evidence as to 
the right to recover any amount. Leftwich states he has reviewed 
the business records of plaintiff and the business records of the 
corporation showed a particular charges to have been made. 
Leftwich's affidavit was based on records not admitted in 
evidence or included with the motion for summary judgment. Nor 
did the affidavit show any foundation for the admissibility of 
the records. 
Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, 1983 (U.R.E.), provides, 
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal 
knowledge of the matter." The affidavit of Leftwich (R.26) on 
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the issue of the amount due and owing D & L Supply does not 
purport to rely on the personal knowledge of Leftwich but upon 
the records of the corporation. However, the copies of the 
corporate records are not included. Thus, the records, not 
Leftwich's personal knowledge, were the basis of the judgment. 
The records were hearsay. Rule 801(c), U.R.E. "'Hearsay1 is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted." See State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 
1981); State v. Gray. 777 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986); Utah Dept. of 
Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984). 
In this case the records are clearly hearsay. Although Rule 
803(6), U.R.E., 1981, provides an exception for business records, 
that rule applies only when the records themselves are offered. 
In this case the evidence is hearsay on hearsay. Nor does the 
affidavit suffice to establish the admissibility of the records 
under Rule 803(6) had the records been offered. There is no 
showing the records in this case were kept in the "regularly 
conducted" business of D & L Supply. Nor is there foundation 
that the records were made "at or near the time" of the 
recording. There is no testimony of the records custodian or 
other qualified witness as to the methods by which the records 
were accumulated or kept. Therefore, the affidavit is wholly 
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deficient to establish the required foundation for the 
admissibility of the records. The "additional requirements" to 
establish foundation were not presented in the affidavit. See 
State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d at 683. See also, State v. Long, 
P.2d , 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1986), where this Court found the 
foundation insufficient to support the admissibility of official 
records. 
Recently, in United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 
1986), the importance of showing the foundation for admission of 
business records was discussed. The Court said: 
"The idea behind Rule 803(6) is that when a record is 
kept with sufficient regularity, the existence of an 
entry (or the absence of one) is good evidence that the 
thing took place. . . . Business records are reliable 
to the extent they are compiled consistently and 
conscientiously." Id. p. 192. 
The foundation to establish reliability is clearly lacking 
in this case. 
Finally, Leftwich's affidavit (R.26) as to what D & L 
Supply's records showed violated the best evidence rule. The 
affiant was specifically addressing the contents of a record. 
Under such circumstances, the records themselves are the best 
evidence of their contents. Rule 1002, U.R.B., 1983; McCormick, 
Evidence, 3d Ed. §§ 230-231. There is no showing the records 
could not be made available nor were copies offered. C.f., Meyer 
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v. General American Hospital Corp,, 659 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 
1977) . Under such circumstances, the affidavit violated the best 
evidence rule. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978) (reading of material contained in exhibits 
not admissible violates best evidence rule)• In Interna. 
Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), 
plaintiff brought an action to recover amounts due on a corporate 
obligation. The Court held the best evidence rule was violated 
where oral summaries of documents were presented. The Court said 
such summaries must be reduced to writing. Also, the court found 
insufficient foundation to establish admissibility under the 
business records doctrine. 
Based on the evidence of record, respondent was not entitled 
to summary judgment because there was no admissible evidence 
supporting the amount due, if any. 
B. The evidence was insufficient to support summary 
judgment for D & L Supply because there is an issue of fact as to 
whether there was sufficient jurisdiction over the defendant John 
Saurini. The facts make it clear from the pleadings that 
defendant is a resident of Colorado. (R.l) The defendant 
expressly denied he had engaged in any "transaction of business 
within the State of Utah," and "not subjected himself to any 
jurisdiction of" the Utah courts. Since jurisdiction was 
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contested, the respondent was obligated as a part of its motion 
for summary judgment to show a basis for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction. Mabud v.Pakistan International Airlines, P.2d 
, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1986) (on rehearing). It was incumbent 
upon the respondent to show "minimum contacts" sufficient to 
support jurisdiction. 78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953; Synergetics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985). 
The defendant did not contract to supply services or goods 
in this State. 78-27-24(2), U.C.A., 1953. See Mailory 
Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d 
1004 (Utah 1980); Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Potadrill, 608 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1980). The affidavit of Leftwich shows only conversations 
that Saurini may have had with Leftwich agreeing to be personally 
bound as to shipments. The conversations are not set forth only 
the legal conclusion. There is a statement that Saurini has been 
to plaintiff's place of business, but there is no showing his 
presence was to conduct business or that his presence was related 
to the claims in this case. The only other allegation is that 
payment on shipments would be made to plaintiff's offices in 
Lindon, Utah. These allegations are insufficient to establish 
the factual basis for jurisdiction where jurisdiction was not 
admitted and was contested. There is no showing any of the 
contracts were entered into in Utah. Utah Synergetics ex rel. 
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Laneer Indust. Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co,. 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 
1985). 
In Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc.. 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 
1980), this Court held activities more than those alleged and 
shown in this case were insufficient to establish jurisdiction 
under Utah's Long Arm Statute, 78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953. The court 
held the "jurisdictional facts" had to provide a basis for the 
court's judgment. Id. 1309. The Court noted where jurisdiction 
is contested, the plaintiff must establish the basis for 
jurisdiction. The facts in this case do not show that Saurini's 
presence in Utah was related to the actual contracts or accounts 
sued on, do not show they were negotiated in Utah, the supplies 
were to be provided appellant in Colorado, only payment was to be 
made to D & L in Utah. The litigation must be related to the 
acts of the defendant and the litigation must arise out of those 
activities. Id. 1311. The allegations in the Leftwich affidavit 
do not support jurisdiction, or at least leave the matter 
incomplete for the purposes of summary judgment. To allow 
jurisdiction on the showing in this case would allow jurisdiction 
over every out-of-state purchase from a business in Utah even if 
by mail or telephone. 
The affidavit supporting D & L's motion does not cover the 
jurisdiction issue by showing facts sufficient to establish the 
12 
respondent's right to summary judgment. The affidavit itself is 
deficient and conclusionary. There is a conflict between the 
affidavit and the answer of the appellant. Under such 
circumstances, the granting of summary judgment was improper. 
Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985); Olwell v. Clark, 
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). The findings of fact, prepared by 
counsel for the trial judge, cannot enlarge on the evidence. 
Summary judgment was improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment in this case was improper. The affidavit 
of the plaintiff's president was not based on admissible 
evidence. A summary based on inadmissible and improper evidence 
cannot stand. 
In addition, the issue of jurisdiction was contested in this 
case and the affidavit of respondent was incomplete to resolve 
the jurisdictional issue and based on conclusions. Therefore, 
there was no basis for summary judgment and this Court should 
reverse and remand for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William J. Cayias 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Affidavit of Jack Leftwich (R. 26) 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-27 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
D & L SUPPLY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN SAURINI, 
Defendant. 
A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. 70,513 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Utah ) 
JACK LEFTWICH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. That I am president of the Plaintiff corporation. 
2. That for more than 20 years I have been acquainted with 
and have done business with the Defendant John Saurini both as an 
individual and to corporations that he has either owned or been 
associated with. 
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3. In 1982, I concluded that I would no longer do business 
with the Defendant on a corporate basis and advised him that any 
further orders placed would have to be done by him personally and 
he would have to be personally responsible for payment of any and 
all materials shipped from the State of Utah. 
4. That after conversing with the Defendant about being 
personally responsible, he stated that he would agree to pay 
personally for any and all materials and would place orders and 
direct where they were to be shipped. 
5. The Defendant John Saurini has been to Plaintiff's 
place of business in Lindon, Utah on a number of occasions. 
6. Before each and every shipment was made, it was agreed 
that the shipments would be made FOB Lindon, Utah and that 
payment would be made to Plaintiff's offices in Lindon, Utah. 
7. I have reviewed the business records of the Plaintiff 
and have determined that total charges made by the Defendant from 
the time that we began doing business with the Defendant 
personally in November of 1982 to and including credits given to 
him in 1984 show that there were charges made in the total sum of 
ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY TWO and 
70/100 ($167,842.70) DOLLARS. The business records of the 
corporation further show that payments were made during the same 
period of time in the sum of TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
15 
TWENTY THREE and 59/100 ($27,523.59) DOLLARS. There is a total 
principal balance owing in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND 
THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN and 11/100 ($140,319.11) DOLLARS. 
8. Our business records show that computing interest at 
eighteen (18%) percent as was the terms and conditions of the 
early invoices show that interest at eighteen (18%) percent on 
the charges made total EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIX and 
77/100 ($81,306.77) DOLLARS. During the period of shipment, we 
increased the interest to twenty four (24%) percent. 
9. Interest has been calculated on the balance owing on 
Plaintiff's account at the rate of ten (10%) percent which I am 
advised is the legal rate and interest calculated on the unpaid 
balance at ten (10%) percent totals FORTY THOUSAND FORTY NINE 
($42,049.86) DOLLARS. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 1986. 
/s/ Jack Leftwich 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of March, 
1986. 
/s/ Claire Jones Clarke 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at Provo Utah 
December 4, 1989 
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78-27-24, Jurisdiction over nonresidents—Acts submitting 
person to jurisdiction. Any person, notwithstanding section 16-
10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and separate 
maintenance, the maintenance in this state of a matrimonial 
domicile at the time the claim arose or the commission in this 
state of the act giving rise to the claim; or 
(7) The Commission of sexual intercourse within this state 
which gives rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, 
to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing 
responsibility for child support. 
17 
